AEON GP Signature v1

Convention identifier: aeon.gp.signature.v1

1. Purpose

aeon.gp.signature.v1 defines a minimal, deterministic signature vocabulary for AEON documents.

It standardizes how one or more signatures are represented inside aeon:envelope.

It is intended to work with:

• aeon.gp.security.v1

• aeon.gp.integrity.v1

This convention defines signature metadata and structure, not cryptographic trust policy.

2. Scope

aeon.gp.signature.v1 defines:

• where signatures live

• how signature entries are structured

• what each field means

• what a signature covers

It does not define:

• trust models

• certificate formats

• key discovery

• algorithm approval policy

• timestamp authority behavior

3. Dependency

aeon.gp.signature.v1 depends on aeon.gp.integrity.v1.

A signature under this convention signs the declared integrity hash, not raw source text.

4. Envelope Placement

Signatures live inside:

"aeon:envelope":securityEnvelope = {
  signatures:signatureSet = [ ... ]
}

The signatures field must be an array.

This allows:

• single signatures

• multiple signatures

• extension-defined countersigning patterns

• stable extension without changing shape

5. Signature Coverage

Each signature covers the document integrity hash declared in:

aeon:envelope.integrity

This means:

• compute canonical document hash using aeon.gp.integrity.v1

• sign that hash

• store the signature entry in aeon:envelope.signatures

A signature does not directly sign:

• comments

• whitespace

• envelope contents

• source formatting

6. Signature Entry Structure

Each signature entry is an object.

Required fields

Minimal form

{
  alg = "ed25519"
  kid = "alice"
  sig = #...
}

7. Field Definitions

7.1 alg

Declares the signature algorithm.

Example:

alg = "ed25519"

This field identifies how sig must be verified.

Examples may include:

• ed25519

• ecdsa-p256

• rsa-pss-sha256

This convention does not mandate which algorithms are permitted. Profiles or processors may restrict them.

7.2 kid

Declares the signer key identifier.

Example:

kid = "alice"

This field identifies which verification key should be used.

The identifier is opaque to AEON.

Possible values may include:

• local ids

• DID fragments

• fingerprint-derived ids

• organization-specific key names

Examples:

kid = "alice"
kid = "org.example.signing.2026"
kid = "did:example:alice#key-1"

7.3 sig

Declares the signature value.

Example:

sig = #AABBCC...

This field contains the signature bytes encoded using the agreed binary representation.

AEON does not interpret the bytes.

8. Optional Fields

The following optional fields may be used if needed.

These are optional because the minimal model should stay small.

8.1 hashAlg

Optional explicit copy of the hash algorithm.

hashAlg = "sha256"

Useful when signatures may be detached or exported independently.

8.2 hash

Optional explicit copy of the signed integrity hash.

hash = #7A91E4C8...

Useful for debugging, detached workflows, or validation traces.

8.3 time

Optional declared signing time.

time = "2026-03-08T19:00:00Z"

This is informative unless another convention defines trusted timestamp semantics.

8.4 issuer

Optional signer label.

issuer = "Alice Example"

Informative only.

9. Minimal Example

aeon:header = {
  encoding = "utf-8"
  mode = "strict"
}

message = {
  from = "Alice"
  to = "Bob"
  text = "Meet at the lighthouse"
}

"aeon:envelope":securityEnvelope = {
  integrity:integrityBlock = {
    alg:string = "sha256"
    hash:bytes = #7A91E4C8...
  }

  signatures:signatureSet = [
    {
      alg:string = "ed25519"
      kid:string = "alice"
      sig:bytes = #91A8F2...
    }
  ]
}

10. Multiple Signatures

Multiple signatures are represented as multiple array entries.

Example:

"aeon:envelope":securityEnvelope = {
  integrity:integrityBlock = {
    alg:string = "sha256"
    hash:bytes = #7A91E4C8...
  }

  signatures:signatureSet = [
    {
      alg:string = "ed25519"
      kid:string = "alice"
      sig:bytes = #AA11...
    }
    {
      alg:string = "ed25519"
      kid:string = "bob"
      sig:bytes = #BB22...
    }
  ]
}

Each signature verifies the same integrity hash.

This allows:

• co-signing

• approval chains

• parallel signatures

without changing document coverage.

11. Verification Procedure

To verify a signature entry, a processor must:

1. Verify the document integrity hash using aeon.gp.integrity.v1

2. Read the signature entry

3. Resolve the verification key from kid

4. Verify sig against the integrity hash using alg

If the integrity hash fails, signature verification must fail.

12. Failure Conditions

A processor should treat the signature as invalid if:

• alg is missing

• kid is missing

• sig is missing

• alg is unsupported

• kid cannot be resolved

• sig does not verify against the integrity hash

A document may still parse as AEON even if signature verification fails. That is a processor-level security result, not a syntax failure.

13. Non-Goals

aeon.gp.signature.v1 does not define:

• trusted signers

• key servers

• certificate chains

• revocation

• timestamp trust

• signature policy

These belong to:

• profiles

• protocols

• application security models

14. Relationship to Other Conventions

aeon.gp.signature.v1 works with:

• aeon.gp.security.v1 — envelope structure

• aeon.gp.integrity.v1 — canonical hash model

It may be extended or complemented by:

• aeon.gp.encryption.v1

• future event-log integrity conventions

• future subtree-proof conventions

15. One-Line Definition

aeon.gp.signature.v1 defines a minimal signature vocabulary for AEON documents in which one or more signatures inside aeon:envelope.signatures verify the integrity hash declared by aeon.gp.integrity.v1.